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I. INTRODUCTION
America has struggled through over a half a century of frustration trying
to create a viable framework for the establishment, modification, and
enforcement of child support obligations. Even then, it took the proverbial
eight hundred pound gorilla in the form of Congress threatening to deny the
states access to federal funds to get states to sign on to the current scheme.'
Given the relative homogeneity of America, how much more challenging is it
to devise a scheme that might be more or less acceptable to a diverse global
community where the essence of the scheme impacts "the family"--the
construct that lies at the heart of a community's social, cultural, religious and
sometimes even political diversity?2
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law, Hamden, Connecticut,
david.rosettenstein@quinnipiac.edu.
1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669a (1935). See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 667 (1935) and related regulation
45 C.F. R. §302.56 (2006) (requiring states to establish mandatory guidelines for child support); 42 U.S.C.
§ 666(0 (1935) (requiring all states to adopt the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act).
2. As has been pointed out in the context of another international convention on support, the
choice of law rule may regulate both the identities of any claimants and defendants, as well as the amount
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The international community also has fifty years of experience in the same
arena.3 In 1999, dissatisfaction with aspects of the various conventions in force
led a Special Commission operating under the aegis of the Hague Conference
to propose the development of a comprehensive new approach to be embodied
in a Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and other
Forms of Family Maintenance.4 This process is well under way.5
One of the problem areas in the development of any such scheme is the
issue of the law applicable to the maintenance obligation. The difficulties in
this area led the Special Commission in 2003 to establish the Working Group
on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations.6 The contentious nature
of this project has led to a general strategy that envisages that a choice of law
regime would be included in an optional instrument.7
At the operational level any scheme could be premised on the application
of foreign law or be restricted to domestic law, or involve some structured
combination of these. The operational regime in America generally gives the
law of the issuing state the right to govern the nature, extent, amount and
duration of current payments and other obligations of support, and the payment
of arrearages under the order.8  Because of constitutional due process
requirements, the issuing state must be a state that has personal jurisdiction over
the potential obligor, and this means that this individual either would have
consented to the jurisdiction of the court or, for a variety of different possible
reasons, will have some other significant connections to the state. 9
The Hague Working Group is proposing what it describes as a "cascade"
of potential choice of law rules. 0 Under this arrangement, preference would
of support. See Carol S. Bruch, The 1989 Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations, 40 AM. J.
COMP. L. 817, 821-25 (1992). These themes are not trivial when the potential classes of defendants include
stepparents, sperm and egg donors, birth mothers, "intended" parents, same sex partners who may or may not
be parties to a civil union, or a similar relationship that under a given state's law may recognize them as
parent even as other states decline to do so. In the American context, this list opens up the awkward
possibility of a federally acceptable convention exposing a potential obligor to liability under ajurisdictional
premise which grants authority to a foreign jurisdiction to generate that liability with respect to that obligor
even when any relationship to the child is not only not recognized by federal law, but even may be offensive
to federal law.
3. See William Duncan, The Development of the New Hague Convention on the International
Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, 38 FAM. L. Q. 663-66 (2004).
4. Id. at 665.
5. Id. at 663.
6. Id. at 683.
7. Id.
8. See John J. Sampson, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1996) Statutory Text, Prefatory
Note and Commissioners' Comments, 32 FAM L. Q. 385, 490-92 (1998) (discussing § 604 of the Act).
9. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act § 201 (1996).
10. Report of the Working Group on Applicable Law, at Art. C, para. 10, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON
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be given to the country of the maintenance creditor's habitual residence, and in
the event that the "creditor" is unable to obtain maintenance under this regime,
the law of the forum or, if this fails to permit recovery, the law of the parties'
common nationality." The avowed purpose behind this arrangement is to
reinforce an approach in the draft convention designed "to favour the
maintenance creditor in international situations. ''12 This point marks an
interesting and challenging logical elision on the part of the Working Group.
It is one thing to have a convention, targeted to ensuring that established rights
are vindicated, structured to favor the rights holder. It is quite another to use
a presumption of entitlement of a claimant to establish the jurisdictional
premise which will determine whether there is an entitlement in the first place.
Indeed, even if some such an entitlement exists, it is not necessarily obvious
that we should be looking to a "preferred" jurisdiction of the creditor to
determine the extent of the entitlement.' 3 While the idea of using the law of the
forum drew resistance on the basis that it invited forum shopping, 4 quite
appropriately the Working Group points out that using the law of the claimant's
habitual residence "allows a determination of the existence and amount of the
maintenance obligation having regard to the legal and factual circumstances of
the social environment in the country where the creditor lives and engages in
most of his or her activities."' 5 The difficulty is that correspondingly there is a
potential debtor operating in a different country and a different social milieu.
In the absence ofjustification primarily grounded on tackling the Gordian knot,
why the latter's reference framework should be discounted is not clear. Indeed,
even if the "creditor's" law is preferred it is not clear that this will
automatically "favor" the creditor.16
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, Preliminary Document No 22, (June 2006) (reporting for the Attention of the
Special Commission of June 2006 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family
Maintenance) [hereinafter Doc. 22].
11. Id. at Art. C, para. 13, Alternate proposals would allow the law of the forum to be invoked
immediately if the "debtor" has his habitual residence there, or if the proceedings are instituted in such a
forum, or in a third variation, if it is the debtor's habitual residence and the creditor requests that law be
applied.
12. Id. at para. 11.
13. In general, it is possible that one jurisdiction might be preferred for the purpose of identifying
an appropriate claimant or obligor and another jurisdiction used to determine the amount claimable.
14. Doc. 22, supra note 10, at para. 23.
15. Id. at para. 13.
16. For example, one of the traditional problems experienced under the current American regime
is that an obligor is ordered to pay pursuant to child support guidelines existing in an American state. Such
guidelines base the award, at least in part, on the obligor's American income. This opens the door to the
argument that this income, and hence the award, has purchasing power in the obligee's country that far
exceeds the child's needs. See, e.g., Nischal v. Nischal, 879 A.2d 813 (Pa. Super. 2005) (comparing
Washington D.C. and India); Gladis v. Gladisova, 856 A.2d 703, 708 (Md. 2003) (comparing Maryland and
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The reason why we should experience some disquiet with a blanket
approach aimed at reinforcing the claimant's position is that any choice of law
rule will be the premise that in one fell swoop may capture the subtleties of any
conflicting international philosophies, and in the process annihilate a significant
Slovakia: the lower cost of living in the child's locality not a proper basis for deviating from the guidelines).
In Gladis the court took the position that the child's needs were a function of the parent's economic position,
and seemed to suggest that the obligor's economic strength should be transferred to the child in the nation
of less wealth. Id. at 712, 714. Such an analysis conflates the theme of needs, cost of living and standard
of living-themes to be returned to below. Gladis, 856 A.2d at 719 (Raker J. dissenting). In the domestic
context, the Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted that it might be unreasonable for a court to ignore the
economic realities of a cost of living differential between obligor and obligee's states. Booth v. Booth, 541
N.E.2d 1028, 1029 (Ohio 1989) (comparing the cost of living in New York and Ohio). Under the proposed
Hague regime this problem might or might not arise depending on whether the country of the creditor's
"habitual residence" premises the award on the creditor's needs in that jurisdiction or on the debtor's
resources. The rational for the convention's proposed choice of law rule suggests it should be the former, but
there is no reason why the claimant's country might not use the obligor's resources as the basis for the
claim-adopting the Gladis perspective. Doc. 22, supra note 10, at para. 13. To make matter's more
complicated, if the basis chosen for the award is one that seeks to ensure that the child enjoys a "standard of
living" that at least equals that of the obligor, there are at least fourteen countries in the world where it
appears to be more expensive than it would be to maintain the same lifestyle in New York City. THE
ECONOMIST, POCKET WORLD IN FIGURES 88 (2006). Here, indeed, the proposed choice of law regime would
"favour" the creditor. Then again, there are at least four or five countries in the world where statistically
speaking it is possible to enjoy a higher "quality of life" for less money than that "life" would cost in New
York. Id. Indeed, as was pointed out in Gladis, in such a scenario the increased purchasing power of U.S.
dollars in the Slovak Republic would mean that while the U. S. obligor generating those dollars was enjoying
a "modest and comfortable life," the child was being placed in the position where she would have the ability
"to live a life of luxury". Gladis, 856 A.2d at 718-19 (Raker J. dissenting). As an additional complication,
the operative jurisdiction may premise the award on the "cost of living" in the claimant's country rather than
on what it takes to maintain a specific "standard of living"--conceptually different benchmarks. See Nischal,
879 A.2d at 815. In one case, a Colorado appellate court held that the guidelines could be deviated from if
to apply them would be "inequitable, unjust, or inappropriate" but that the burden would be on the contestant
to establish that deviation was both reasonable and necessary. In the Interest of A. K., 72 P.3d 402,404-05
(Colo. Ct. App. 2003). The appellate court accepted the trial court's determination that what would be
considered "a normal lifestyle" would be significantly more expensive in Russia than in Colorado, and that
this determination reflected a focus on the child's needs rather than the father's income-though ultimately
the trial court's order was reversed in part due to a failure to fully consider the details of the relevant "living
expenses." See id. at 405. To add insult to injury, a potential obligor may argue that a guideline based award
is inequitable to him because there is a different "standard of living" between his jurisdiction and that of the
claimant. See Edwards v. Dominick, 815 So. 2d 236, 239 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (purporting the difference in
standard of living between Louisiana and South Africa). The converse set of arguments also is recognized.
Here the obligor suggests that the burden ordinarily imposed by the guidelines should be reduced because of
the obligor's relatively high cost of living. See In re Marriage of Dortch, 801 P.2d 279,283 (Wash. Ct. App.
1990) (describing the high cost of living in Alaska.); In re the Marriage of Welch, 905 P.2d at 132, 136-37
(Mont. 1995) (describing the higher cost of living in Washington D.C. would be an acceptable reason for
deviating from the guidelines if the cost of living is established by proper evidence); In re Marriage of
Beecher, 582 N.W.2d 510, 514 (Iowa 1998) (obligor's higher cost of living in California not a basis for
departure from the guidelines).
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number of them. And these subtleties, as we shall see at some length with
respect to America, can be very subtle indeed. Moreover, to offset the intuitive
appeal of an asserted claim for child support, it is worth remembering that a
foreign support order imposed on "unsuitable" criteria can expose an American
obligor to what at best may be a debt that cannot be satisfied or eliminated and
at worst to the prospect of incarceration.
The rest of the article, through a discussion of some aspects of the child
support obligation in the context of the American experience, aims to reveal
some of the sorts of concerns and nuances that are at stake as competing
jurisdictional perspectives come into play.
II. CHILD SUPPORT: WHOSE Ox is BEING GORED?
As a basic proposition, if the only interest involved in a child support
award is what benefits the child, the governing legal regime in most instances
should be one that produces the highest possible award because, when it comes
to child support, virtually without exception, money matters. 
1 7
In reality, the policy considerations impacting child support, and
parenthetical questions related to our later discussion of whether to demand
income optimization, reflect the concerns of four constituencies, namely, the
parent caring for the child (the residential parent), the non-residential parent,
17. See, e.g., Martin Dooley & Jennifer Stewart, Family Income and Child Outcomes in Canada,
37 CAN. J. ECON. 898 (2004) (positive relationship between income and child outcomes); Joe Blanden & Paul
Gregg, Family Income and Educational Attainment : A Review ofApproaches and Evidence for Britain, 20
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 245 (2004) (family income has a causal relationship with educational
attainment); Louise Sequin, et al., Understanding the Dimensions of Socioeconomic Status that Influence
Toddlers' Health: Unique Impact of Lack of Money for Basic Needs in Quebec's Birth Cohort, 59 J. OF
EPIDEMIOLOGY AND COMM. HEALTH 42 (2005) (lack of money for basic needs has a significant impact on
toddlers' health); Don Kerr & Roderic Beaujot, Family Relations, Low Income, and Child Outcomes: A
Comparison of Canadian Children in Intact, Step-, and Lone-Parent Families, 43 INT'L J. COMP. SOC. 134
(2002) (low income has significant impact on childhood difficulties in lone-parent and step-families); E. Jane
Costello, et al., Relationships Between Poverty and Psychopathology, A Natural Experiment, 290 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 2023 (2003) (poverty has major effect on children's conduct and oppositional defiant disorders);
Pamela A. Morris & Lisa A. Gennetian, Identifying the Effects of Income on Children 's Development Using
Experimental Data, 65 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAM. 716 (2003) (some suggestion increased income
improves development of low-income children with regard to school attachment and positive social behavior);
Lawrence M. Berger, Income, Family Structure, and ChildMaltreatment Risk, 26 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES
REV. 725 (2004) (suggests income and family structure affects family's overall risk of child maltreatment);
Jay Bainbridge, et al., Who Gets an Early Education? Family Income and the Enrollment of Three- to five-
year-oldsfrom 1968 to 2000, 86 Soc. So. Q. 724 (2005) (strong link between family income and early
education enrollment); Erik Plug & Wim Vijverberg, Does Family Income Matterfor Schooling Outcomes?
Using Adoptees as a Natural Experiment, 115 EcON. J. 879 (2005) (family income has a significant effect
on school attainment); Jake M. Najman, et al., The Generational Transmission of Socioeconomic Inequalities
in Child Cognitive Development and Emotional Health, 58 SOC. SC. & MED. 1147 (2004) (family income
related to child cognitive development and emotional health).
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the child, and society at large."8 Those considerations relevant to us were
articulated by the American Law Institute (ALI), after almost a decade of
analysis, as follows:
1) That parents share income with a child in order that the child
enjoy
a) A minimum decent standard of living when the combined
income of the parents is sufficient to achieve such result
without impoverishing either parent; and
b) A standard of living not grossly inferior to that of either
parent;
2) That a child not suffer loss of important life opportunities that
the parents are able to provide without undue hardship to
themselves or their other dependents;
3) That residential parents be treated fairly;
4) That non-residential parents be treated fairly;
5) That child-support rules not discourage the labor-force
participation or vocational training of either parent;
6) That child-support rules take into account a child's need for
care;
7) That child-support rules be readily comprehensible, and
administrable, and reflect popular understanding of the duties
and obligations of parents to a child and to each other.19
III. CHILD SUPPORT: GROUNDING THE CALCULATION
When it comes to determining the amount of child support due, there are
four stock approaches that appear on the American radar screen.
The first requires the non-residential parent to contribute child support to
a level that equalizes the standard of living of the residential and non-residential
households.2" Although widely advocated in feminist literature, no American
jurisdiction formally implements it. 2
The second, the Percentage of Obligor Income model, establishes the
award solely on the basis of a certain percentage of the obligor's income.22 The
amount awarded is simply a function of the demands placed on the resources
18. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (AI. Law. Inst. 2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
19. Id. § 3.04
20. Id. at 574.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 572.
[Vol. 13:2354
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of the obligor.23 The obligee parent's "performance" only impacts the
aggregate resources available to the household.
The third is the Income Sharing model. The award is a percentage of the
parents' combined incomes, the percentage being determined by what an
economic analysis suggests would have been assigned to support a child were
that combined income to be found in an intact household.24 The obligation is
to pay, pro rata, the same percentage of each parent's income after the family
breakdown. 25 Here, the residential parent's performance directly impacts the
amount available to that parent and the child and also affects the burden on the
obligor, but only to the extent that the percentage of the combined income
attributable to child support varies with the aggregate amount of the parents'
incomes. 26 Each parent's contribution to child support varies in proportion to
that parent's income. Because the relationship between income and obligation
is not linear, as the combined income goes up, the burden for each parent
relative to his or her own income declines, and in this model it declines an
equivalent proportion for each parent. Accordingly, in percentage terms, the
cost/benefit consequences of "performance" by a parent are equal. This
proposition is only true in absolute terms if the incomes and standards of living
of the households are equivalent-which ordinarily they won't be-so, again,
"under performance" by one parent may result in both the child and the
residential parent being under-supported, and in fairness terms the allocation
of the relative burdens in absolute terms may be unfair. However, on the plus
side, this model permits avoiding a work disincentive for the residential
parent.27
A drawback of the Income Sharing model is that it does not lend itself to
producing an equivalent standard of living in each household. As a result, the
model may impose relative and absolute economic suffering on the child. This
possibility supplied the ALl with ajustification for casting aside concerns about
creating a work disincentive.28
23. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18.
24. Id. at 572.
25. Id. In an international context, one of the criticisms of the application of a state law derived
guideline developed on an Income Shares model is that the economics of the model will be based on United
States' data indicating what parents in an intact household spend on their children, and that it is unrealistic
to apply these data to the entire world in an attempt to equalize standards of living. Gladis, 856 A.2d at 717
(Raker J. dissenting).
26. Id.
27. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.05A, at cmt. i. One argument is that, in time, such a
disincentive is a disservice to the residential parent because when the child grows up the child support ends.
Id.
28. See id.
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The ALI child support model starts with an Income Sharing analysis but
it then adds a supplemental payment from the obligor.29 This supplemental
payment declines as the income of the residential household increases. Thus,
in this model, economic under-performance by the residential parent increases
the burden on the obligor, while any adverse effect on the residential
household's resources arising from the division of the notional joint household
economy is dampened by the supplement from the obligor. Accordingly, the
model, in inter-parent fairness terms, is sensitive to under-performance by the
residential parent, although vis-a-vis the child the impact of under-performance
is nullified-at least if the non-residential parent has the resources to pay the
supplement.
IV. CONSTITUENCY INTERESTS AND IMPUTATION AND OPTIMIZATION
As we saw, the ALI Principles identified four constituencies with a vested
interest in a child support award-the residential parent, the non-residential
parent, the child and society at large. The Principles accept that the
constituencies' values and interests may be competing so that it is difficult to
fully implement any one of them.3"
The underlying spectrum of policy considerations and the various
approaches (suggested and used) to calculate child support open the door to our
next level of inquiry. The establishment of a child support award inevitably
requires the legal regime to determine the resources out of which that award
may be made. Typically, the question we have to answer is what is each
parent's "income?" For this purpose, and for the purpose of our present
discussion, should we allow, or require, the relevant legal regime to impute
income to a parent? And, as yet another layer in the analysis, even if
imputation in permitted in principle, are there limits on the extent to which this
should occur? By way of an example, can the regime require that an individual
qualified as a neuro-surgeon work as such, or just work as a general surgeon,
or work as a general practitioner, or just work? What if the parent in question
is the residential parent and wishes to remain at home to care for the child?
29. Id. § 3.05A, at cmt b. The formula envisages a base amount, which is the percentage of the
obligor's income that if paid would ensure all parties the same standard of living, if the parents had equal
incomes. The supplement is an additional amount aimed at ensuring that the child enjoys a minimum decent
standard of living, if the combined incomes of the parents are capable of achieving that result without
impoverishing either parent, as well as ensuring that the child has a standard of living not grossly inferior to
that of either parent. As the residential parent's income increases the supplement decreases. When the
parents' incomes become equal, the supplement disappears. Id.
30. Id. § 3.04, cmt. a.
[Vol. 13:2
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A. The Public Purse and Other Society Interests
There is another dimension to this problem that is particularly relevant in
the international context. Single-parent family poverty is a universal
phenomenon across all developed economies regardless of individual cultural
or social characteristics. That is, it is the economics as such that is flawed in
a way that can only be remedied by public fund transfers.3 In such a situation,
the essential balance that needs to be struck is one between the public purse and
family needs, not between the non-residential parent and the family.
Transported to the international arena, the choice of law rule ultimately has the
power to answer the question of whether a particular country's public funds
will be burdened?32 Not totally surprisingly in this regard, as far as the Hague
drafting process is concerned, one choice of law rule seems to have made its
way directly into the tentative draft of the convention itself without too much
fuss. It provides that "[t]he right of a public body to seek reimbursement of a
benefit provided to the creditor in place of maintenance shall be governed by
the law to which the body is subject."33 It should be noted, however, that even
where the transfer of public funds is required, the legal regime's stand on
imputation and optimization may dictate the magnitude of that transfer and the
extent of any demand for reimbursement. The fact that any paying "public
body" is likely to be one in the "creditor's" country of habitual residence
suggests that there should be no inconsistencies on the issue of imputation and
optimization as between the creditor's basic claim and the public body's
demand for reimbursement. But this need not necessarily be the case. If, for
example, the public body's initial contribution is capped, its regulatory regime
should not be in a position to demand optimization or even imputation beyond
the extent of the public contribution. In such a context, should the "creditor"
31. See id. § 3.04, at cmt. h.
32. Ordinarily, this is likely to be a one-dimensional problem involving a decision as to whether
the authorities of the court's own jurisdiction should support the child. In the international scene, and
certainly with respect to American states, one is not likely to see a system receptive to the idea that the public
authority in an American state, at the behest of a court in a foreign country, could be obligated to support a
non-resident child in that other country. Of course, it is conceivable that an obligor, having paid child
support, is left so impoverished that he or she comes to depend on public resources in one form or another.
Ordinarily this should not happen because support guidelines are supposed to have an adequate self-support
reserve built into them. The realities may be otherwise.
33. Tentative Draft Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and other Forms
ofFamily Maintenance, at Art. 32(2), Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Document
no.16 (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter Doc. 16]. Interestingly, this structure allows the conceptual framework in
which the public body operates to determine the legitimacy of the obligee's claim. In the international
context, for example, this would allow entities in countries with broad social support infrastructures to
establish a legitimate claim against an American obligor in a context where an American public entity may
not have provided support to the obligee.
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be entitled to demand more of a potential obligor, or should the public body's
limit define the magnitude of a "deserving" claim, at least where imputation or
optimization is involved?34
Beyond the above concerns, the starting point is that society ought not to
be required to support a child whose parents have adequate resources to do so. 5
Over and above that, society is concerned to see that sufficient support is
provided for the care, nutrition, education and well-being of children as the next
generation.36 In this context, the ALI sees economic inadequacy of a parent as,
not only injurious to the child, but also as an unwise under-investment in an
important social resource.37
From the American perspective, America rejects, as a social ethic, a public
role of primary guarantor of a child's economic well-being.38 At best, the
public purse's function is subsidiary. Accordingly, to the extent that the child's
needs place a demand on that purse, the obligor is unlikely to be allowed to
avoid necessary optimization. But, in turn, the most the state can demand is
performance to a level that removes the burden from the public purse. Ideally,
the level of state support would be one which advances the totality of the state's
interests, such as those related to health and education, never mind the child's
ideal interests. But, this is not likely to be the case. At best, state interest
justified optimization demands are likely to be limited to those necessary to
plug an obvious hole-referenced to some poverty standard-in a still leaky
dike.
B. The Child's Interests and Parental Autonomy
Ideally, a child should be left unharmed financially by family dissolution.
However, ordinarily, two households cannot live as cheaply as one. As the
child and the residential parent share a common household, usually it is not
possible to hold the child harmless economically and not do the same for the
residential parent. The effect, in concept, is to impose the economic costs of
the dissolution entirely on the non-residential parent.39 Recognizing this fact,
the ALI adopts two reference standards. First, the child should enjoy a
minimum decent standard of living-assuming the possibility of the parents
34. From an American perspective such a "limit" might be seen as particularly problematic in
instances where the foreign country's level of public support exceeds what is considered "acceptable" in
America.
35. See, e.g., Kramer v. Kramer, No. FA-91 032 1225-S, Slip. Op. at *19 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr.
19, 1992).
36. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 cmt. b.
37. Id.
38. See id. § 3.04 at cmt. h.
39. Id. § 3.04 at cmt. c.
[Vol. 13:2
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mustering sufficient resources to do that.4" Second, the child should not suffer
disproportionately compared to other family members.4
Sometimes, it may be possible to decouple the child's economic interests
from those of the residential household. The most notable example of this is
with respect to "life opportunities," especially those relating to education. The
concern is that parents under-invest in a child who is not in a common
household.42 Thus, we can adopt a position that a child should be left unharmed
if the parents can "afford" to provide a given opportunity.43 Since the basis of
this "entitlement" is "affordability," not willingness, this conceptualization lays
the source of any resource generation demand notionally at the door of society,
but actually in the hands of the demanding (usually residential) parent. The
effect is that one parent loses economic autonomy to the other. The extent of
that loss is regulated by an external determination of what a parent is capable
of doing to "afford" the entitlement. In this process we need to determine
whether "affordability" should be determined on the basis of imputed income."
There is a further limiting condition. Since the benchmark is a potential loss
by the child, the objective should not demand performance beyond that which
would have been expected if the family had remained intact. Accordingly,
production at the level that was achieved in the marriage will suffice, unless
enhanced performance reasonably could have been anticipated in an intact
family to meet the demands of future "opportunities." Nevertheless, the open-
ended question of what are legitimate "opportunities" potentially exposes the
obligor to significant pressure towards optimization.
A relevant value that may be more uniquely American is one which posits
that when it comes to dealing with a higher income parent, that parent should
be allowed to benefit disproportionately from the fruits of his or her own labors
relative to other family members.45 This value enjoys substantial, but not
unanimous, support in America and is implicit in the formulation of all current
American child support rules.4 6 While the comments to the ALl Principles
suggest that the value generally is not subject to compromise in an interest
40. Id.
41. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. c.
42. Id. at cmt. j.
43. See id.
44. Courts have pointed out that any guideline based structure is premised on "affordability" rather
than the child's actual needs. See Nischal, 879 A.2d at 816 (quoting Mascaro v. Mascaro, 803 A.2d 1186
(Pa. 2002)).
45. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. d.
46. Id. Arguably a similar tenet can be found in the Scandinavian countries to the extent that they
consider that maintenance should only be granted to a divorced spouse in exceptional circumstances. Doc.
22, supra note 10, at para. 36.
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balancing process, in reality the extent to which the higher income parent is left
with a higher standard of living is a result of the impact of the other competing
interests.47 Thus, parental autonomy reflected in a decision to attempt to
optimize income in the parent's own interests may be undercut by competing
demands. Here we face an interesting boundary problem. Even if competing
demands cannot compel a parent to optimize income, can these interests assert
a priority claim when and if the income is optimized? Should the answer be
specific to the situation and simply reflect a balance between the "utility" of the
claim and the burden of the resource generator's self-imposed optimization
efforts?
C. The Residential Parent's Interests
The residential parent is concerned to not carry a disproportionate share
of the out-of-pocket costs attributable to raising the child. In addition, this
parent should not suffer a disadvantage through opportunity cost losses
associated with child rearing. We could tackle this latter issue by valuing the
child services rendered, or we could do this by acknowledging the extent to
which the child rearing function limits the residential parent's market
earnings." Both of these premises lay a foundation for a claim against the other
parent's reserve capacity to enhance his or her income. Unfortunately, both
premises open the door to opportunism on the part of the residential parent.
The residential parent's interests have to be balanced against the non-residential
parents' interests and in "appropriate" cases yield to them.49
The Principles tread carefully when it comes to the residential parent's
employment. They argue that it is important that child support rules not
"discourage," as distinct from encourage, the residential parent's labor force
participation." During the child's minority, the gainful employment of the
residential parent "to the extent consistent with the needs of the child"'" serves
everyone's interests. After that minority, it is in the interests of the residential
parent to have maximized the quality and quantity of past labor force
participation. 2 Two aspects of this justify comment. First, the residential
parent's "obligation" is not couched in imperative terms. While the benefits of
market participation are recognized, optimization is not demanded. Moreover,
these benefits can be offset by the needs of the child, the arbiter of which the
47. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. d.
48. Id. at crnt. e.
49. Id.
50. Id. at cmt. I.
51. Id. at cmt. e.
52. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. e.
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Principles fail to identify. Structurally, the burden seems to be placed at the
door of the obligor to demonstrate that the residential parent's non-market-
related contributions to the child's needs are unwarranted.
The Principles do provide some glosses. If there is no child under the age
of six in the residential household income should be imputed.53 That is, a move
in the direction of optimization should be demanded, to a level that the
residential parent could reasonably earn "considering the parent's residential
responsibility for the children of the parties.. . ."" The Principles start with
a premise that they are not willing "to second guess the hard choices facing
parents with residential responsibility for preschool children."55 This is partly
because of the difficulty of securing adequate day care and meeting employer
expectations while serving as a residential parent.56 Accordingly, with a child
below six, the safe harbor is absolute and the residential parent does not even
have to try to be fair to the obligor, and indeed is given this permission without
any examination of whether the choice made by the residential parent actually
is reasonable with regard to the interests of the child. It simply is assumed that
it is.
The ALl suggests that receipt of child support by a residential parent does
not seem to discourage labor market participation. 7 Various reasons have been
advanced to explain this phenomenon. First, child support payments are
uncertain and market participation is a means of hedging this risk.
Additionally, this participation may reflect cooperation in the form of burden-
sharing by the residential parent to encourage continued support flow. This
may explain why there is an enormous return per dollar in the child's
educational outcomes-the residential parent seeks to please the obligor
through the child's performance, complimented by enhanced participation by
the payor in the child's life to monitor the payor's investment. 58 But there is the
possibility that this result is just a function of the dollars rather than behavioral
responses to the dollars. After all, we know that generally outcomes are more
favorable the higher the household income. Even accepting the Principles
analysis, if its chain of causation is correct, it suggests that there might be a
justification for moving from a neutral position of not discouraging market
participation to one of affirmatively encouraging it.
53. Id. at § 3.14 at cmt. e.
54. Id. § 3.15(l)(a).
55. Id. § 3.15 at cmt. b.
56. Id.
57. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. I.
58. Id. (citing ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF
CHILD SUPPORT 225 (1993); Jonathan R. Veum, Interrelation of Child Support, Visitation, and Hours of
Work, 115(6) MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 40-47 (June 1992)).
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The choices involved in work-derived income optimization are seen as
different for residential and non-residential parents. For the latter, the choice
is between work and leisure. With the former, it is a choice between
exchanging market labor for child-rearing. Given the dual identities of the
residential parent, especially one who in the intact family was the primary
parent, the Principles suggest that residential parents are more sensitive to work
disincentives than non-residential parents, even where the residential parent has
a long history of attachment to the labor market.59 In the ALI view, the interests
of children and residential parents almost inevitably will produce work
disincentives, but that rules should seek to restrict such situations to the
unavoidable minimum.6"
That said, the Principles require that child support rules take account of the
child's need for care.6 The ALI position is that the interests of children and
society are not always served by the residential parent's gainful employment
and that, from the child's perspective, the residential parent's personal
provision of needed care, particularly in the early years, may be a legitimate
trade-off against market employment-although, as the child ages, the balance
of preference should shift in favor of market participation.62 Given the inability
of child support statutes to be particularly nuanced, it seems legitimate to ask
whether it is appropriate to premise the entire support structure on a
presumptive entitlement to not participate in the market, especially given the
acknowledged pressure that the residential parent's dual identity creates in
favor of non-participation. Of course it may not be economically rational to
participate in the market, as where the transaction costs exceed the returns.
Even here, there may be reasons to justify apparent economic irrationality, such
as where a short term loss while in education will generate increased earning
capacity to the advantage of the residential parent, the child and the non-
residential parent. Generalized, this proposition highlights the fact that
optimization is both a concept and a process, so that it may become difficult to
evaluate competing demands for optimization occurring in different contexts.
Thus, asking for restructuring of an investment portfolio to achieve higher
yields cannot necessarily be judged in the same way as would an assertion that
housing costs should be reduced to enhance liquidity.63 In such an environment,
consistency in relative burden imposition becomes difficult.
59. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 18 § 3.04 at cmt. 1.
60. See id.
61. See generally PRINCIPLES.
62. Id. § 3.04 at cmt. n.
63. Id. § 3.14(3)-(5). Other troublesome scenarios include voluntary unemployment or under-
employment and the appearance of a new spouse or partner for the residential parent. Id.
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D. The Role of Fairness
"Fairness" requires that the residential parent not carry, disproportionately,
the costs of child rearing. 64 In turn, the non-residential parent's interests are
recognized by giving respect, but not a controlling deference, to the idea that
a parent need not contribute more than would have been done in an intact
household; by not requiring this parent to share earnings to the point of
equalizing household income; and by this parent not being required to suffer
"pointlessly" by virtue of the support obligation.65 Apart from the fact that
international support disputes involve countries with differing costs of living,
which intrinsically may enhance the risks of an "excessive" demand, the above
concerns raise numerous optimization related issues.
To start with, economic under-performance by the residential parent can
make that parent's share of the costs disproportionate, especially regarding
fixed child related costs. On the other side of the coin, as the approach relative
to the non-residential parent is less concerned with what is proportionately
reasonable, and focuses more on what is necessary for the child, and since the
residential parent controls the household budget, that parent, through under
performance, is in a position to increase the pressure on the non-residential
parent to optimize income--even if the latter ends up disproportionately
burdened.
Beyond these considerations, in the domain of "fairness," even when the
household no longer contains a child under six, the Principles lean in favor of
the residential parent. The ALl sees the concept of imputing income to the
residential parent, that is invoking a process that moves in the direction of
optimization, as inherently problematic because it reflects a legal judgment
about how the residential parent should allocate time between gainful
employment and child rearing-"a matter normally left to the decision making
of parents., 66 The linguistic ambiguity in the use of "parents" in this context
exposes an interesting hiatus in principle. No doubt ajoint decision by parents
in an intact household as to market participation is appropriately theirs-at least
short of neglect. It is less clear that the underlying premise continues to be
viable in a post-dissolution universe when the consequence is an obligation
imposed on the obligor, backed, at worst, by the sanction of incarceration and
which at best generates a debt that cannot be shed. To permit this situation
seems to attribute such an absolute significance to the child care function that
a case by case analysis would seem to be a better approach. While the ALl
calls for such an analysis with children beyond the age of five, even here any
64. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. k.
65. Id.
66. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.15 at cmt. b.
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pressure to work is mitigated by the residential parent's responsibilities for the
parties' children.67 Indeed, the ALl notes that to the extent that income is
imputed to the residential parent, it penalizes the child economically for the
parent's decision to give the child more, rather than less, direct parental care.6"
Apparently overlooked is the fact that it is the residential parent's decision
which leads to this result. Implicit therefore in this structure is an acceptance
of the fact that the residential parent's choice inherently is legitimate-
consequently, the Principles accept that the imputation of income to the
residential parent should be undertaken with even greater caution than is
accorded imputation of income to the non-residential obligor.69
Under the ALI scheme, imputing income to the residential parent has the
effect of reducing the obligor's financial burden and, in the event of non-
production by the residential parent, also reduces the resources available to the
child.7" The process, however, does not expose the residential parent to legal
sanctions. The ALI's position is that there is less incentive to shirk on the part
of the residential parent because that parent shares any resources earned with
the child.7 What the Principles do not acknowledge fully is that this
moderating influence is offset where the obligee sees a possibility of "under
performance" being compensated for by increased demands on the non-
residential obligor. What the Principles draw attention to is that the residential
parent may see a trade-off between caring for the child and employment.72 The
difficulty with reinforcing the legitimacy of any such analysis is that it relies
initially on the residential parent's subjective perception (and perhaps
ultimately a court's perception) of that parent's "worth" to the child.73 This
arrangement, in turn, can be countered or reinforced by the burdens, or lack
thereof, imposed on the obligor.
Overriding the residential parent's prioritization of commitments becomes
even harder if personalized care by a parent is perceived as socially normative
behavior,74 that is, if, in principle, any market driven substitution for those
67. Id. § 3.15(1)(a).
68. Id. § 3.15 at cmt. b.
69. Id.
70. See id. § 3.14 at cmt. e.
71. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.14 at cmt. e.
72. Id.
73. Even if a child care program is subsidized, values and beliefs about parenting may obstruct take
up of this benefit. See Edward D. Lowe & Thomas S. Weisner, You have to Push It--Who's Gonna raise
your Kids?: Situating Child Care and Child Care Subsidy Use in the Daily Routines of Lower Income
Families, 26 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 143 (2004).
74. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 72 (1989) (assuming the
parental responsibility is a "traditional ideal").
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residential services has no intrinsic legitimacy. The above analysis results in
the treatment of a residential parent being reviewed exclusively in the realm of
fairness between the adults without an examination of whether any failure to
generate resources works to the advantage of the child. Accordingly, any lack
of optimization may produce operational unfairness-a fact that the Principles
do not seem willing to acknowledge.75 The absence of a recognized market
based exchange value for the services rendered by the residential parent, except
to the extent that the parent acknowledges such an exchange, means that we
have no reference standard for "fairness." And that is just as between the
adults. As indicated above, this basic posture forecloses the possibility of the
evaluation of the residential parent's earnings-related conduct with reference
to the child's interests, not just in terms of services rendered to the child by the
residential parent, but also with respect to additional marginal benefits to the
child in terms of the possibility that more revenue could purchase services that
the residential parent cannot provide in the immediate term, as well as in regard
to that parent's opportunity costs in the form of lost savings or underdeveloped
human capital that might endure to the child's benefit in the future. That said,
the literature indicates that not all forms of work benefit the children of all
parents. The consequences for a child of employment of a hard-to-place worker
parent in a low prestige job are not necessarily positive.76
E. The Non-Residential Parent's Interests
As to the non-residential parent, America has rejected the notion that child
support is a voluntary contribution.77 Rather, it is a legal duty. Nevertheless,
an element of voluntariness remains where the non-residential parent does not
have to contribute more to the support of the child than notionally would have
been contributed if the child was living in an intact household.78 Conceptually,
this is the basis of one of the standard models of child support. Intrinsically,
this approach does not hold the child harmless, nor prevent unequal suffering,
75. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.14 at cmt. e.
76. Thus, even with positive psychological benefits for the residential parent, there may be adverse
impacts on her parenting style if the work is low prestige. See generally C. Cybele Raver, Does Work Pay
Psychologically as well as Economically? The Role ofEmployment in Predicting Depressive Symptoms and
Parenting Among Low-income Families, 74 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1720 (2003). Also, if the parent can be
classified as "very-hardest-to-employ," following that parent's employment, a child's school engagement may
decrease and aggressive behavior increase, even with substantial increases in parents' employment and
income. See Hirokazwe Yoshikawa et al., Effects of Earnings-supplement Policies on Adult Economic and
Middle-childhood Outcomes Differfor the 'Hardest to Employ', 74 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1500 (2003).This
result is contrary to that encountered where the parent is just "moderately hard to employ." See id. at 1518.
77. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. f.
78. Id.
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nor guarantee a decent standard of living. Accordingly, in part, the approach
may reflect the non-residential parent's interests.79 The approach also
legitimates the idea that any duty only extends to supporting the child rather
than benefiting the residential parent-although factually "spillover" is almost
inevitable.8" However, this approach does not determine how much income
ought to be generated. It only defines how income that is generated should be
distributed. Thus, it just supplies the foundation on which optimization issues
play out.
The ALI proposes a support formula based on the marginal difference in
spending by parents with notionally equal incomes, compared to what a
childless couple would spend on themselves.8 This approach seeks to strike a
balance between the non-residential parent's interests, the child's interests in
not suffering, and the residential parent's interests in not contributing dispro-
portionately to support.8" This conceptualization does not inform any optimiza-
tion analysis. Nevertheless, the underlying interests do. Thus, parents can be
expected to perform to a level that obviates the child's suffering. This does not
tell us the extent to which each can be expected to perform relative to the other,
but if we accept the legitimacy of a non-residential parent's interest in only
sharing income with the child and not with the residential parent, this does
suggest a boundary marker against which optimization demands may be
measured.
Some questions almost have a metaphysical character-and the ALI
analysis has few answers. Should a non-residential parent's optimization
burden be reduced because of fewer opportunities to enjoy a relationship with
the child? Should such a claim be offset by the residential parent's increased
responsibility and additional child-care duties?83 Also, the ALl rejects factoring
in remarriage.8 ' The ALI's perspective is that child support and child-care
obligations are a form of negative dower for both parents and thus don't justify
a relative adjustment.85 Apparently, conceptually, this negative dower would
not support a demand for optimization. Moreover, where an obligor "acquires"
subsequent children to support, in the ALI view they should be treated like any
existing child, except, arguably, to the extent that the additional mouth pushes
one or other household into a zone of absolute financial hardship (based on
79. Id. But to the extent that the obligation emerges from guidelines that require a payment that
exceeds the child's reasonable needs, these interests are discounted. See Nischal, 879 A.2d at 815.
80. See generally PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04.
81. Id. at 570.
82. Id. § 3.04 at cmt. f.
83. See id. § 3.04 at cmt. g.
84. Id. § 2.15.
85. See generally Id.
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some percentage of the poverty level).86 Such a scenario would seem to support
a demand for income optimization by the person who "generated" the marginal
burden in order to abate this situation as far as possible.
Custody awards generally result in the child being placed with the parent
who historically performed that role. Frequently, that parent's market value
will have suffered by virtue of that role. This negative handicapping may be
compounded by a post-divorce supervisory function. The combination of these
child-derived penalties may adversely impact the child's economic well-being.
To what extent can we make demands on the income performance of the non-
residential parent to offset this? The Principles, at least as far as child support
is concerned, limit the demands to such performance as avoids a gross-disparity
between the economic circumstances of the child and those of a higher-income
non-residential parent.87 The goal is not to equalize household incomes, but to
strike a balance between ensuring that the child not suffer disproportionately,
and capping the non-residential parent's outlay at a level hypothetically found
in an intact family.88 This might dictate enhanced performance, but not
necessarily optimization. And there might be further limits. Thus, a critical
goal of the ALl child support framework is that it not discourage labor force
participation by either parent.89 As to the non-residential parent, this produces
an analysis suggesting that any disincentive flowing from the obligor retaining
less of his earnings is offset by an encouragement to work harder to reach a
desired level of income. However, this analysis holds up only as long as the
obligation is set a level where there is a marginal return for the obligor on the
additional effort.9" Additionally, the analysis relies on an assumption that the
physical or psychological effort involved in producing income at the margin
remains the same. If this is not true, additional labor force participation may
be rejected-that is, even if additional income is possible, there is no necessary
linear relationship between the economic incentives to optimize income and the
psychological/physical resources to do so. This is somewhat analogous to the
residential parent's dual identity dilemma--discussed above-which resolves
itself into a tension between what the actor can do and what the actor wants to
do.
The Principles suggest that support determinations be calculated to
enhance vocational training, even at the expense of short-term income
optimization, especially for a residential parent who already may be under-
invested in human capital and who, through child care and earning
86. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.16 at cmt. c.
87. Id. § 3.04 at cmt. i.
88. Id.
89. See id. § 3.04 at cmt. 1.
90. Id.
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responsibilities, may be hampered in efforts to acquire additional training.91
The system should encourage investment in such training in a way that makes
worthwhile gains for both the residential household and the non-residential
parent.92 This suggests, at least vis-A-vis the non-residential parent, that the
system should be less encouraging of vocational training at his relative expense
unless the effect, in due course, is to reduce his burden, or unless we can justify
his contribution to the training through the ultimate marginal benefit to the
child in the form of enhanced residential household resources. Also, the
Principles only encourage vocational training, not education for its aesthetic
value or the cultural enrichment of the residential household.93 Followed to its
logical conclusion, child care provided by the residential parent for the parent's
psychic benefit and at the expense of income generation, should not be
encouraged. And, we should take a hard look at any justification by the
residential parent for non-optimization, where that justification is based on that
parent's determination of the child's "needs" especially where those "needs"
do not demonstrably demand economic under-performance.
V. THE SYSTEM EFFICIENCY PRINCIPLE-ANOTHER EIGHT HUNDRED POUND
GORILLA ELIMINATES THE CAMEL'S NOSE
Despite all the subtlety extracted above, the choice of law rule may dictate
the application of an approach that would suggest the above analysis is
pointless.
The Principles noted the need for the system to be administrable and
understandable. This, in turn, readily elides into a premise that sees an
overarching goal as being achieving efficiency within the child support system.
This would demand that, wherever possible, individualized determinations be
minimized.94 In the American context, this emerges as an argument that the
opportunity to argue for deviations from established child support guidelines
should be limited.95 Thus, in the few reported cases where the arguments have
91. PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 3.04 at cmt. m.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Thus, in In re the Marriage of Andersen, 895 P.2d 1161, 1164-65 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995), the
court pointed out that a finding that one parent has a higher cost of living will not ordinarily justify deviation
from the guidelines and that the guideline commission had considered a specific provision to permit a
deviation from the guidelines in such a circumstance but had concluded that ordinarily implementing such
complex criteria "would only serve to make support awards less uniform and predictable and more subject
to individual whim and manipulation. Id. at 1164. That said, the court acknowledged that the failure to
expressly include a higher cost of living as a reason for deviation from the guidelines did not preclude doing
so where "the difference in cost of living alone would render application of the guidelines inequitable, unjust,
or inappropriate." Id. at 1165.
95. See, e.g., Ball v. Minnick, 648 A.2d 1192, 1197 (Pa. 1992) (stating that "[tihe clear intent of
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been raised that the guidelines should not be used because they produce an
"excessive" award relative to what the circumstances in the foreign country
would demand, an efficiency principle has been used to block further
analysis-why let the "nose" of detailed analysis intrude?96
True, when in comes to interstate arguments along the same line in
America, there seems to be more willingness to entertain an argument for
deviation based on "cost of living" differential considerations and the like.97
While the reason for the distinction between the national and international
approaches is not clearly articulated, one cannot help guessing that what is
"foreign" is almost inevitably deemed to be more of a problem.98 This posture
very easily slides over into one which will be readily embraced by American
legal institutions, namely, that any mechanism should be simple and involve an
efficient use of judicial and administrative resources. Nothing gets closer to
achieving this goal than the rote implementation of established child support
guidelines even if these tend to produce inappropriate or even absurd results.99
It is difficult to imagine an American jurisdiction willingly departing from its
domestic standards towards imputation and optimization (or lack thereof) in the
face of countervailing pressures from overseas on criteria that would in any
event have to be independently established-at least unless the domestic regime
absolutely insists that such a departure be undertaken. If this hypothesis is
correct, the argument of efficient use ofjudicial resources will swallow all the
other nuanced analyses, except to the extent that they are already embedded in
existing guidelines. What plays in Peoria will always be right for Peoria.
The fact that the courts even now seem inclined to follow the path of least
resistance when it comes to support determinations with an international
component would be yet another argument for caution in selecting the choice
of law rule. In the international sphere the right rule would seem to be one that
entertains subtleties.
the guidelines.., was to do away with individual case-by-case determinations ofjust what constitutes the
reasonable needs and expenses of the particular parties involved and thus to limit the trial court's
discretion.").
96. "One of the primary purposes of the Guidelines 'was to limit the role of trial courts in deciding
the specific amount of child support to be awarded in different cases, by limiting the necessity for factual
findings that had been required under pre-guidelines case law."' Gladis, 856 A.2d at 712 (citing Petrini v.
Petrini, 648 A.2d 1016, 1019 (1994)). "Allowing a deviation from the Guidelines based on the standards of
living in different localities would encourage trial courts to examine those circumstances on a case-by-case
basis and, no doubt, depart from the guidelines more frequently." Gladis, 856 A.2d at 712.
97. Id. at 711-12.
98. "How, for instance, could fact finders consistently determine the precise differences in standards
of living in two different countries, given that the value of currency changes constantly and that middle-class
living conditions in Maryland may be considered poverty or extravagance elsewhere?" Id. at 712-13.
99. Thus in Gladis the guidelines required the obligor to pay $497 per month, while at most the
actual expenses of the child appeared to be no more than $280 per month. Id. at 717 (Raker J. dissenting).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Absurd results may arise if we impose blanket obligations to optimize or
impute income. Thus, an American income generator may asked to produce
"too much," and conversely imposing an optimization burden on an individual
where wages are very low may be fair as a matter of abstract principle but
ridiculous in absolute terms as far as the relative burden on the parents is
concerned.
Ideally, any choice of law rule would identify a legal regime, which under
the circumstances, enabled the interests of the relevant constituencies to be
addressed with subtlety. However, a variable choice of law rule involving a
case by case analysis of available regimes would be highly inefficient. Instead,
the key would seem to be to adopt a choice of law rule but include a number of
limited defenses, or conditional rule changes, built into the choice of law
protocol and embodying as much refinement as is deemed desirable. For
example, we could select a legal regime based on the claimant's habitual
residence, but subject to a limiting condition to the extent that any burden
imposed on an obligor could not demand performance beyond current activities
unless the claimant could establish that performance at some other level was a
matter of compelling necessity. Even such a structure may be too detailed.
Perhaps in the interests of gaining acceptability and minimizing the need to
impute income, the choice of law rule should simply be subject to a blanket
limitation that no more may be sought than the claimant's actual reasonable
costs to maintain the obligor's standard of living, if the cost of living is less
than that in the country of the obligor's habitual residence. And where the
claimant's cost of living is greater than that of the obligor, the primary responsi-
bility to meet those marginal excess costs (if necessary including the possibility
of imputing income and demanding optimum performance) would be placed at
the door of the person whose move produced the cost of living differential.
Finally, in the American context with its established guideline structure,
recognition of the diverse pressures outlined above in the international context
may be difficult unless the deviation criteria permitted by the guidelines are
sufficiently flexible to accommodate multi-country related problems.
Additionally, and in particular, American courts must be sensitized to the need
to be more receptive to arguments for deviation where foreign countries are
involved, and in the process to resist the appeal of arguments of judicial
efficiency and simplicity that follow from rote application of the guidelines
themselves.
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